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ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
     This appeal marks the second time this case has reached 
this court.  In its first incarnation, Kurz v. Philadelphia Elec. 
Co., 994 F.2d 136 (3d Cir.) ("Kurz I"), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 
1020 (1993), we reversed the district court's grant of summary 
judgment to defendant Philadelphia Electric Co. ("PECo").  
Applying the rule established in Fischer v. Philadelphia Elec. 
Co., 994 F.2d 130 (3d Cir.) ("Fischer I"), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 
1020 (1993), we held that genuine issues of material fact 
remained as to whether PECo, acting in its role as fiduciary 
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), had 
made affirmative material misrepresentations to its employee- 
beneficiaries by denying, or failing to disclose when asked, that 
it was seriously considering changes in its pension benefits 
program.  On remand, after a bench trial, the district court 
entered judgment for those members of the plaintiff class who had 
asked about a change in benefits after March 1, 1987, the date on 
which the district court found that serious consideration began.  
Kurz v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., No. 91-2771, slip op. at 24 (E.D. 
Pa. May 13, 1994) ("District Ct. Op.").  We will apply the 
formulation of "serious consideration" established in Fischer v. 
Philadelphia Elec. Co., ___ F.3d ___ (3d Cir. 1996) ("Fischer 
II"), and on the basis of that analysis we will reverse the 
district court's decision and enter judgment for defendant PECo. 
                                               I. 
     This action stems from PECo's efforts to change its 
pension plan to provide more lucrative benefits to its employees.  
PECo announced this change on July 2, 1987, and implemented it on 
August 1, 1987.  The plaintiff class consists of various 
employees who retired between February 1, 1987, and July 1, 1987, 
and who were therefore ineligible for the plan. 
     On April 30, 1991, the plaintiffs filed suit in the 
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 
alleging that PECo had long known of its intent to change its 
pension package and had breached its fiduciary duty under ERISA § 
404, 29 U.S.C. § 1104, by representing that no change was under 
consideration.  The district court certified the class, then 
entered summary judgment for PECo.  In Kurz I, we reversed.  
Relying on our decision in Fischer I, we held that PECo could be 
liable for breach of fiduciary duty if it had made affirmative 
misrepresentations, such as denying that any change was being 
considered when in fact a change was under serious consideration.  
Kurz I, 994 F.2d at 139.  We remanded for a trial on the merits 
to determine, inter alia, when the plan came under serious 
consideration.  The district court found the following facts, the 
vast majority of which were stipulated. 
     Since 1977, PECo had conducted periodic reviews of its 
pension fund program as part of its ordinary course of business.  
PECo also participated in an annual or biannual survey that 
compared benefits packages at selected utilities. 
     On October 2, 1985, the consulting firm of Towers, 
Perrin, Forster & Crosby ("TPF&C") completed a study of PECo's 
pension benefit plan.  TPF&C concluded that the plan was well- 
funded and that the current rate of contributions would be 
sufficient to cover improvements in the benefits package.  At 
approximately the same time, Michael Crommie, PECo's Director of 
Employee Services, noted that PECo's comparative ranking in the 
benefits survey had fallen.  On June 23, 1986, Crommie sent a 
memorandum to Ronald Downs, Manager of the Industrial Relations 
Department, asking whether TPF&C should be asked to prepare a 
pension benefit study based on the survey results.  Downs 
responded, "Probably not, but suggest we consider after we see 
[this year's] survey results.  Obviously, some input from TPF&C 
will be required with regard to our recommended modifications to 
plan!" 
     In 1986, PECo took over the task of compiling the 
benefits survey.  Fred Beaver, an Administrative Assistant in the 
Personnel and Industrial Relations Department, was assigned the 
task of preparing the survey.  In February, 1987, Beaver received 
data from other utilities on their 1986 benefits levels.  Beaver 
concluded that PECo's position was below the mid-point for the 
industry.  After discussing the matter with his colleagues, 
Beaver suggested that PECo increase its benefits.  On February 
27, 1987, Beaver contacted Donald Fleischer, a consultant at 
TPF&C, to discuss a possible pension plan change.  
         During March, 1987, the pace of deliberations 
increased.  Charles L. Fritz, PECo's Vice President of Personnel 
and Industrial Relations, met with members of the Independent 
Group Association, PECo's unofficial employee representative, to 
discuss an increase in pension benefits.  Fritz told them that 
the time was ripe to make significant changes in the pension 
plan.  It was also during March that TPF&C began calculating the 
results of various changes in the pension benefit rate.  TPF&C 
continued its work through April and May. 
         On May 6, 1987, Crommie and William Murdoch, a 
consultant with TPF&C, met to discuss competing alternatives for 
the amended plan.  On May 11, Fritz reviewed the costs of the 
various alternatives with Murdoch.  On May 20, TPF&C presented 
the results of its pension benefit study and recommended a 
pension increase.  The TPF&C report discussed seven different 
proposals for changing the plan.  By memorandum dated May 28,  
Fritz contacted J.L. Everett, III, PECo's Chief Executive 
Officer, and John H. Austin, Jr., PECo's President & Chief 
Operating Officer, to request permission to recommend a pension 
change to the Board of Directors.  Everett and Austin were the 
only two individuals with authority to make recommendations to 
the Board.  After receiving permission, Fritz prepared a 
recommendation, which was approved at the Board's June 22, 1987, 
meeting. 
         Based on this record, the district court concluded that 
PECo began seriously considering an increase in its pension 
benefit plan in March, 1987.  It therefore set March 1, 1987, as 
the date on which PECo's duty to inform its employees arose.  The 
district court entered judgment for those retirees who asked 
about pension benefits and retired after that date.  The court 
entered judgment for PECo on the claims of those retirees who 
asked about pension benefits and retired before that date.  This 
appeal followed. 
                               II. 
         Our analysis proceeds within the confines of Fischer Iand Fischer 
II.  Liability turns on the materiality of PECo's 
representation that no change was being considered.  Fischer I, 
994 F.2d at 135.  Under Fischer II, whether PECo's statement was 
a material "misrepresentation" turns on whether a change in 
benefits was in fact under serious consideration at the time the 
statement was made.  Fischer II, ___ F.3d at ___ [typescript at 
11-12]. "[S]erious consideration requires (1) a specific proposal 
(2) discussed for purposes of implementation (3) by senior 
management with the authority to implement the change."  Id. at 
___ [typescript at 15].  Based on this formulation, the district 
court's conclusion that serious consideration began on March 1, 
1987, was incorrect. 
          Under the first Fischer II factor, we must examine the 
record for evidence of a specific proposal.  No such proposal 
existed until May 20, 1987, when TPF&C presented the results of 
its pension benefits study.  The TPF&C report 
         noted that PECO's normal retirement benefits 
         were below average of the survey group . . ..  
         It commented that PECO needed to improve its 
         pension, [and it] recommend[ed] that 
         alternative pension improvements should take 
         into consideration 1. objectives for income 
         replacement at various pay levels, 2. the 
         company's desired competitive posture, 3. 
         cost implications for alternatives, 4. 
         posture with respect to introduction of 
         company-matching contribution in savings 
         plan, and 5. other benefits such as life 
         insurance and medical benefits. 
District Ct. Op. at 12.  Most importantly, the study "proposed 
seven alternate benefit improvements."  Id. at 13.   
         This document marked the culmination of PECo's 
considerable efforts, with the help of TPF&C, to "gather[] 
information, develop[] strategies, and analyz[e] options."  
Fischer II, ___ F.3d at ___ [typescript at 16].  It provided 
specific proposals for the company to evaluate, and it outlined 
factors and principles for senior management to consider.  This 
document was "sufficiently concrete to support consideration by 
senior management for the purpose of implementation."  Id.[typescript at 
16].  Indeed, it appears to have been intended for 
this very purpose.  The TPF&C report therefore satisfies the 
first Fischer II factor. 
         By contrast, the laundry list of pre-May 20, 1987, 
events cited by the plaintiff class falls short of serious 
consideration.  These activities fit comfortably within the 
categories of gathering information, developing strategies, and 
analyzing options that precede the drafting of a specific 
proposal.  As we explained in Fischer II,  
 
         large corporate entities conduct regular or 
         on-going reviews of their benefit packages in 
         their ordinary course of business.  These 
         entities employ individuals, including middle 
         and upper-level management employees, to 
         gather information and conduct reviews.  The 
         periodic review process may also entail 
         contacting outside consultants or 
         commissioning studies.  During the course of 
         their employment, the employees assigned 
         these tasks necessarily discuss their duties 
         and the results of their studies.  These 
         discussions may include issues of 
         implementation.  The employees may also make 
         recommendations to upper level management or 
         senior executives.  As a general rule, such 
         operations will not constitute serious 
         consideration. 
Fischer II, ___ F.3d at ___ [typescript at 17].  The efforts of 
Beaver, Crommie, Downs, and other individuals in PECo's seemingly 
far-flung personnel department illustrate this general rule.  
These individuals were simply performing their ordinary duties.  
Their activities do not constitute serious consideration. 
         Because a specific proposal did not emerge until May 
20, 1987, serious consideration could not have commenced before 
this date.  The existence of a specific proposal, however, does 
not resolve matters. 
         [The Fischer II] formulation does not turn on 
         any single factor; the determination is 
         inherently fact-specific.  Kurz I, 994 F.2d 
         at 139.  Likewise, the factors themselves are 
         not isolated criteria; the three interact and 
         coalesce to form a composite picture of 
         serious consideration. 
Id. at ___ [typescript at 15-16].  Moreover, as we emphasized in 
Fischer II, "these factors do not establish a bright-line rule."  
Id. at ___ [typescript at 18].  We therefore turn to the second 
and third factors. 
         Under the second and third factors, we look to whether 
the specific proposal was being considered for implementation by 
senior management.  As noted, supra, the contents of the proposal 
itself suggest that TPF&C intended its report for consideration 
by senior management for purposes of implementation.  What is 
important for this phase of our inquiry, however, is whether 
PECo's senior management considered the document for purposes of 
implementation.  In addition, consideration must have been by 
senior management with the authority to implement the change.  
This final requirement will not limit serious consideration to 
discussion by the Board of Directors:  "It is sufficient for this 
factor that the plan be considered by those members of senior 
management with responsibility for the benefits area of the 
business, and who ultimately will make recommendations to the 
Board regarding benefits operations."  Id. at ___ [typescript at 
18]. 
         Although the record is sparse on these points, the 
district court found that "[t]he persons having authority in 1987 
to recommend that the PECO Board of Directors implement the 
pension plan changes were Everett and Austin."  District Ct. Op.at 14.  
Based on this finding, we conclude that Everett and 
Austin were the appropriate cadre of senior management whose 
consideration is pertinent. 
         We must therefore determine when Everett and Austin 
began considering the specific proposal for purposes of 
implementation.  The record indicates that on May 22, 1987, 
Everett and Austin submitted the TPF&C report to the Board of 
Directors.  On May 28, Fritz sent a memorandum to Austin and 
Everett setting out the cost for one of the seven proposals and 
requesting their approval to proceed further.  After receiving 
approval, Fritz prepared a recommendation for the Board.  The 
Board made the decision to amend the plan on June 22, 1987. 
         We conclude that Fritz's May 28 memorandum and Everett 
and Austin's subsequent approval of his recommendation mark the 
beginning of serious consideration by senior management for 
purposes of implementation.  We therefore hold that serious 
consideration began on May 28, 1987. 
         In reaching this conclusion, we stress yet again the 
fact-specific nature of our analysis.  Our holding in this case 
does not establish a bright-line rule based on management's 
approval of an employee's request to make a recommendation to the 
Board of Directors, just as in Kurz I we rejected a bright-line 
rule based on the formal proposal of a plan change to the Board 
of Directors.  994 F.2d at 139.  Rather, serious consideration 
depends on "(1) a specific proposal (2) discussed for purposes of 
implementation (3) by senior management with the authority to 
implement the change."  Fischer II, ___ F.3d at ___ [typescript 
at 15].  Here, these factors indicate that serious consideration 
began on May 28, 1987. 
         Based on this analysis, any employee who asked about 
changes in pension benefits after serious consideration began on 
May 28, 1987, but before the formal announcement of the change on 
July 2, 1987, received material misinformation.  We will enter 
judgment for PECo on the claims of all employees who asked about 
a benefits change and retired before May 28.  The record reveals, 
however, that some members of the plaintiff class retired after 
May 28, 1987.  We must therefore consider the viability of their 
claims in light of PECo's statute of limitations defense. 
         ERISA § 413, 29 U.S.C. § 1113, establishes a 
combination of limitations provisions to govern breach of 
fiduciary duty claims.  It provides: 
         No action may be commenced under this 
         subchapter with respect to a fiduciary's 
         breach of any responsibility, duty, or 
         obligation under this part, or with respect 
         to a violation of this part, after the 
         earlier of 
          (1) six years after (A) the date of the last 
         action which constituted a part of the breach 
         or violation, or (B) in the case of an 
         omission, the latest date on which the 
         fiduciary could have cured the breach or 
         violation, or 
          (2) three years after the earliest date on 
         which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of 
         the breach or violation; 
         except that in the case of fraud or 
         concealment, such action may be commenced not 
         later than six years after the date of 
         discovery of such breach or violation. 
 
29 U.S.C. § 1113.  This section thus creates a general six year 
statute of limitations, shortened to three years in cases where 
the plaintiff has actual knowledge, and potentially extended to 
six years from the date of discovery in cases involving fraud or 
concealment. 
         Invoking § 413, PECo argues that the three year period 
for actual knowledge applies.  PECo points out that the benefits 
change was formally announced on July 2, 1987.  No lawsuit was 
filed until April 3, 1991, more than three and a half years 
later.  In addition, the record contains statements by sixteen of 
the twenty members of the plaintiff class stating that they knew 
of the plan change more than three years before the complaint was 
filed.  PECo concludes that on these facts, the claim was 
untimely. 
         The plaintiff class responds by pointing to § 413's 
language on fraud and concealment, claiming it refers to the type 
of behavior in which PECo engaged.  The district court adopted 
this position, explaining, 
         The class action complaint clearly sounds in 
         concealment.  The heart of the complaint is 
         PECO's concealment of the plan to implement 
         the early retirement plan.  PECO admits it 
         had a policy of keeping such matters 
         confidential and telling potential retirees 
         that no such plans existed until formally 
         announced. 
           Section [413] provides a six year statute 
         of limitation for cases of concealment, 
         measured from the time the plaintiff 
         discovers the breach or violation. 
           Members of the plaintiffs' class discovered 
         the breach or violation as early as June 
         1987.  Suit was filed in this matter April 
         30, 1991, less than six years later. 
 
District Ct. Op. at 25-26.  We disagree with the district court's 
interpretation of the statute in the circumstances of this case. 
         The proper interpretation of § 413 presents an issue of 
law subject to plenary review.  Board of Trustees of District No. 
15 Machinists' Pension Fund v. Kahale Engineering Corp., 43 F.3d 
852, 857 (3d Cir. 1994); Sheet Metal Workers, Local 19 v. 2300 
Group, Inc.,  949 F.2d 1274, 1278 (3d Cir. 1991).  We first hold 
that § 413(2)'s three year period applies on the facts of this 
case.  We next hold that the district court misconstrued § 413's 
fraud and concealment language.  We find that the claims of the 
plaintiff class are untimely and barred. 
         We begin with the selection of the 6 year or the 3 year 
limitations period as provided in subsections (1) and (2).  We 
find that the 3 year "actual knowledge" provision of subsection 
(2) applies here.  We first examined the meaning of § 413(2)'s 
"actual knowledge" in Gluck v. Unisys Corp., 960 F.2d 1168 (3d 
Cir. 1992).  We interpreted the phrase "actual knowledge" to 
require actual knowledge of "all material facts necessary to 
understand that some claim exists, which facts could include 
necessary opinions of experts, knowledge of a transaction's 
harmful consequences, or even actual harm."  Id. at 1177 
(citations omitted). 
         In the current case, all the material elements of a 
breach of fiduciary duty claim were patently obvious on July 2, 
1987, the day PECo announced the pension increase.  On that date, 
employees who had asked about benefits and retired before July 2 
knew (1) benefits had been increased, (2) they were not eligible 
for the new package, and (3) no one had told them about the 
change even though they had asked.  This was not a technical 
violation of ERISA, nor a cleverly concealed plan amendment.  
PECo openly announced that certain employees would receive better 
benefits, and others would not.  For those who did not qualify, 
the "harmful consequences" of the change were obvious.  Gluck, 
960 F.2d at 1177.  No "opinions of experts" were needed.  Id.  
Legal consultation was not required.  Id.  The plaintiffs had 
"knowledge of all relevant facts at least sufficient to give 
[them] knowledge that a fiduciary duty ha[d] been breached or 
ERISA provision violated."  Id. at 1178.  The plaintiff class 
therefore had actual knowledge as of July 2, 1987, and § 413's 
three year statute of limitations began to run on that date. 
         We next turn to the "fraud and concealment" language of 
§ 413, which the district court applied to save the class claim.  
The district court apparently interpreted this language as 
referring to the type of ERISA claim in question.  See District 
Ct. Op. at 25 ("[t]he class action complaint clearly sounds in 
concealment").  We disagree. 
         With rare exceptions, the courts of appeals have 
interpreted the final clause of § 413's as incorporating the 
federal doctrine of fraudulent concealment:  The statute of 
limitations is tolled until the plaintiff in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence discovered or should have discovered the 
alleged fraud or concealment.  See J. Geils Band Employee Benefit 
Plan v. Smith Barney Shearson, Inc., 76 F.3d 1245, 1253 (1st 
Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3001 (June 19, 
1996); Barker v. American Mobil Power Corp., 64 F.3d 1397, 
1401-02 (9th Cir. 1995); Larson v. Northrop Corp., 21 F.3d 1164, 
1172-74 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Martin v. Consultants & Administrators, 
Inc., 966 F.2d 1078, 1093-96 (7th Cir. 1992); Schaefer v. 
Arkansas Medical Soc'y, 853 F.2d 1487, 1491-92 (8th Cir. 1988); 
but see Diduck v. Kaszycki & Sons Contractors, Inc., 874 F.2d 
912, 919 (2d Cir. 1989) ("[f]or a breach of fiduciary duty 
involving fraud or concealment, the three year exception for 
actual knowledge does not apply, and a party has six years from 
the time it discovers the breach to bring an action").  
          Although we have yet to address this issue squarely, 
we have implicitly rejected the district court's interpretation 
in dictum.  See Gluck, 960 F.2d at 1177 n.5 ("Although not 
implicated here, we note that the six-year limitation period of 
[§ 413(1)] does not protect defendants in instances involving 
concealment or fraud.").  We now join our sister courts and hold 
that § 413's "fraud and concealment" language applies the federal 
common law discovery rule to ERISA breach of fiduciary duty 
claims.  In other words, when a lawsuit has been delayed because 
the defendant itself has taken steps to hide its breach of 
fiduciary duty, see Barker, 64 F.3d at 1402, the limitations 
period will run six years after the date of the claim's 
discovery.  The relevant question is therefore not whether the 
complaint "sounds in concealment," but rather whether there is 
evidence that the defendant took affirmative steps to hide its 
breach of fiduciary duty. 
         Turning to the case at bar, we find nothing suggesting 
that fraud or concealment delayed the discovery of the breach of 
fiduciary duty claim.  Serious consideration began on May 28, 
1987.  The plan was announced one month later on July 2, 1987.  
Although again eschewing a bright-line rule, we suggest that this 
relatively brief period exemplifies the type of timely 
notification that companies should give their employees.  By 
publicly announcing its decision on July 2, 1987, PECo foreclosed 
any suggestion that it attempted to conceal its plans or engaged 
in a campaign of fraud to prevent the plaintiff class from suing 
for the alleged breach.  The claim, such as it was, lay bare for 
the world to see.  The federal discovery rule, and hence the six 
year fraud or concealment limitation period, does not apply. 
     We therefore hold that § 413's statute of limitations 
bars the fiduciary duty claims of those members of the plaintiff 
class who asked about a change in pension benefits and retired 
after May 28 but before July 2, 1987.  Given our disposition of 
the claims of class members who asked about benefits and retired 
before May 28, we will enter judgment for PECo on the entire 
class's breach of fiduciary duty claim. 
     Our treatment of the breach of fiduciary duty claim 
leaves the plaintiff class with two theories of recovery, 
discriminatory treatment under ERISA § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140, and 
equitable estoppel.  Neither theory has merit.  We reject the 
class's § 510 claim for the reasons announced in Fischer II, ___ 
F.3d at ___ [typescript at 26-27].  As to the equitable estoppel 
claim, our reasoning in Fischer II is equally controlling for 
those members who retired before May 28, 1987.  PECo correctly 
informed these class members that no pension increase was under 
serious consideration.  As a result, these class members cannot 
establish the first element of an estoppel claim, material 
misrepresentation.  See Curcio v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. 
Co., 33 F.3d 226, 235 (3d Cir. 1994) (listing elements of 
equitable estoppel claim under ERISA); Fischer II, ___ F.3d at 
___ [typescript at 25].  We also reject the equitable estoppel 
claim of the post-May 28 class members.  These plaintiffs have 
failed to establish the third ERISA estoppel element, 
extraordinary circumstances.  See Curcio, 33 F.3d at 235. 
         We have never clearly defined "extraordinary 
circumstances," relying instead on case law to establish its 
parameters.  Id.  A review of our precedents indicates that 
extraordinary circumstances do not exist in this case.  To 
support this element, we have previously required a showing of 
affirmative acts of fraud or similarly inequitable conduct by an 
employer.  See Rosen v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders 
Union, 637 F.2d 592, 598 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding that pension 
fund could not deny benefits to participant on grounds that 
participant's employer failed to pay required contributions where 
fund administrator allowed employee to pay contributions 
himself), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 898 (1981); see also Hozier v. 
Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.2d 1155, 1165 n.10 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(citing Rosen).  Elsewhere, we have focused on the network of 
misrepresentations that arises over an extended course of dealing 
between parties.  See Curcio, 33 F.3d at 238 (finding 
extraordinary circumstances where insurer misrepresented type of 
coverage available, informed patient that certain coverage would 
be provided, then disclaimed coverage); Smith v. Hartford Ins. 
Group, 6 F.3d 131, 142 (3d Cir. 1993) (suggesting extraordinary 
circumstances might exist where plaintiff repeatedly and 
diligently inquired about benefits and defendant repeatedly 
misrepresented scope of coverage to plaintiff).  We have also 
cited the vulnerability of particular plaintiffs.  See Curcio, 33 
F.3d at 238 (hospital patient denied coverage for substantial 
claim after hospital represented that coverage would exist); 
Smith, 6 F.3d at 142 (same); but see Gridley v. Cleveland 
Pneumatic Co., 924 F.2d 1310, 1319 (3d Cir.) (rejecting estoppel 
where widow of terminal cancer victim sought increased life 
insurance benefits), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1232 (1991).   
         These cases demonstrate that a plaintiff must do more 
than merely make out the "ordinary elements" of equitable 
estoppel to establish a claim for equitable estoppel under ERISA.  
Gillis v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 4 F.3d 1137, 1142 (3d Cir. 
1993), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 1540 (1994); 
Gridley, 924 F.2d at 1319.  Because of these heightened 
requirements, we have consistently rejected estoppel claims based 
on simple ERISA reporting errors or disclosure violations, such 
as a variation between a plan summary and the plan itself, or an 
omission in the disclosure documents.  See Gillis, 4 F.3d at 1142 
(denying recovery where plaintiffs claimed plan documents failed 
to disclose that severance pay would not be provided to employees 
who continued working for purchaser of corporate division); 
Gridley, 924 F.2d at 1319 (denying recovery despite omission from 
disclosure documents of requirement that employee be "actively at 
work" to qualify for increased life insurance benefits; employee 
was later denied increased benefits based on requirement). 
         Applying these principles to the current case, we find 
nothing to suggest that extraordinary circumstances exist.  At 
best, plaintiffs have established the basic elements of an 
estoppel claim.  There is no conduct suggesting that PECo sought 
to profit at the expense of its employees, no showing of repeated 
misrepresentations over time, no suggestion that plaintiffs are 
particularly vulnerable.  In addition, we note that the district 
court made no finding of extraordinary circumstances.  SeeDistrict Ct. Op. 
at 20, 24.  The plaintiffs seem to have ignored 
the issue, despite the fact that they bear the burden of proof on 
each estoppel element.  See Gillis, 4 F.3d at 1142.  We therefore 
hold that extraordinary circumstances do not exist on the facts 
of this case, and we will enter judgment for the defendant on the 
post-May 28 class members' equitable estoppel claim. 
                               III. 
         The plaintiff class has failed to establish a valid 
claim for breach of fiduciary duty.  Those class members who 
retired prior to May 28, 1987, did not receive material 
misinformation about a benefits change because no pension 
increase was then under serious consideration.  The claims of the 
remaining class members are barred by the applicable statute of 
limitations.  The class's equitable estoppel claim and ERISA § 
510 claim also fail.  We will therefore reverse the district 
court's judgment and enter judgment for defendant PECo. 
 
                            
